Our lovely press. Yesterday we had a bit of a dust-up here at my work, as a result of a Thomas Ricks article in the Washington Post on the American advisory effort in Iraq. It seems Mr. Ricks, or at least a researcher named Julie Tate, discovered the long-available interviews run by the Operational Leadership Experiences team at the U.S. Army's Combat Studies Institute in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Good for them. The interviews are an invaluable source on the current conflict, and a wonderful record of the experiences of hundreds of veterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. I heartily recommend that you do some exploring on their webpage, which is here.

Unfortunately, Ricks and Tate chose to use the interviews to cherry-pick quotations that supported a seriously flawed, opinionated, and out of date news story. So, with no humility whatsoever, I helped Mr. Ricks with a rewrite that more accurately reflects the content of the interviews and the latest information on the training effort in Iraq. The original column is in blue, my rewrites are in black.

Flaws Cited in Effort To Train Iraqi Forces
U.S. Officers Roundly Criticize Program

Effort To Train Iraqi Forces Constantly Evolving
U.S. Officers Recount Difficulties, Successes

The U.S. military's effort to train Iraqi forces has been rife with problems, from officers being sent in with poor preparation to a lack of basic necessities such as interpreters and office materials, according to internal Army documents.

The U.S. military’s effort to train Iraqi forces has overcome innumerable obstacles, including early shortcomings in training and shortages in interpreters, according to Army documents.

The shortcomings have plagued a program that is central to the U.S. strategy in Iraq and is growing in importance. A Pentagon effort to rethink policies in Iraq is likely to suggest placing less emphasis on combat and more on training and advising, sources say.

The adjustments and flexibility of the advising program have been central to the U.S. strategy in Iraq and continue to be important. Ever since the end of major combat operations in the spring of 2003, the Pentagon has shifted its focus from combat to training and advising, sources say.

In dozens of official interviews compiled by the Army for its oral history archives, officers who had been involved in training and advising Iraqis bluntly criticized almost every aspect of the effort. Some officers thought that team members were often selected poorly. Others fretted that the soldiers who prepared them had never served in Iraq and lacked understanding of the tasks of training and advising. Many said they felt insufficiently supported by the Army while in Iraq, with intermittent shipments of supplies and interpreters who often did not seem to understand English.

In hundreds of official interviews compiled by the Army for its public history program, officers who had been involved in the early training and advising of Iraqis frankly discussed the difficulties of the effort. Not surprisingly, some team members were not suited to the task. In addition, the soldiers who prepared the advisors had to work from scratch, since Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was a closed society and they could not foresee all of the problems with training and advising an entirely new Iraqi military. Many advisors also added that they could have used more and better interpreters.

The Iraqi officers interviewed by an Army team also had complaints; the top one was that they were being advised by officers far junior to them who had never seen combat. Some of the American officers even faulted their own lack of understanding of the task. "If I had to do it again, I know I'd do it completely different," reported Maj. Mike Sullivan, who advised an Iraqi army battalion in 2004. "I went there with the wrong attitude and I thought I understood Iraq and the history because I had seen PowerPoint slides, but I really didn't."

The Iraqi officers interviewed by an Army team also complained that they were being advised by officers junior to them who had never seen combat. The Americans also recognized the problems of working with Saddam’s former soldiers. “A lot of the officers had previous Iraqi Army experience and nothing I saw of the old Iraqi Army was a good thing,” said Maj. Mike Sullivan. “While we think we’re there to better the welfare of the troops and train the troops, the Iraqi officers I dealt with felt that the troops were there to better their welfare.”

Gen. John P. Abizaid, the top U.S. military commander for the Middle East, told Congress last week that he plans to shift increasing numbers of troops from combat roles to training and advisory duties. Insiders familiar with the bipartisan Iraq Study Group say that next month the panel will probably recommend further boosts to the training effort. Pentagon officials are considering whether the number of Iraqi security forces needs to be far larger than the current target of about 325,000, which would require thousands more U.S. trainers.

Gen. John P. Abazaid, the top U.S. military commander for the Middle East, told Congress last week that he plans to continue shifting troops from combat roles to training and advisory duties. Insiders familiar with the bipartisan Iraq Study Group say that next month the panel will probably back this ongoing effort. Pentagon officials are considering whether the number of Iraqi security forces needs to be larger than the current target of about 325,000, which would reinforce the importance of the training program.

Most recently, a closely guarded military review being done for the Joint Chiefs of Staff laid out three options for Iraq. It appears to be favoring a version of one option called "Go Long" that would temporarily boost the U.S. troop level -- currently about 140,000 -- but over time would cut combat presence in favor of training and advising. The training effort could take five to 10 years.

Most recently, a military review being done for the Joint Chiefs of Staff laid out three options for Iraq. It appears to be favoring a version of one option called “Go Long” that would increase the number of troops dedicated to training and advising, while slowly reducing the combat presence. This training effort could take five to 10 years.

Despite its central role in Iraq, the training and advisory program is not well understood outside narrow military circles. Congress has hardly examined it, and training efforts lie outside the purview of the special inspector general on Iraq reconstruction. The Army has done some studies but has not released them. Even basic information, such as how many of the 5,000 U.S. military personnel involved are from the National Guard and Reserves, is unusually difficult to obtain.

Despite its central role in Iraq, outside observers have done a poor job in trying to understand the training and advisory program. Congress and the media have hardly looked into the effort, including ignoring publicly available Army interviews and studies.

But the previously unreported transcripts of interviews conducted by the Army's Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., offer a view into the program, covering a time from shortly after the 2003 invasion until earlier this year.

But the readily accessible transcripts of interviews conducted by the Army’s Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., offer a view into the early program, covering a time from shortly after the 2003 invasion until earlier this year.

One of the most common complaints of the Army officers interviewed was that the military did a poor job of preparing them. "You're supposed to be able to shoot, move and communicate," said Lt. Col. Paul Ciesinski, who was an adviser in northern Iraq last year and this year. "Well, when we got to Iraq we could hardly shoot, we could hardly move and we could hardly communicate, because we hadn't been trained on how to do these things." The training was outdated and lackadaisical, he said, adding sarcastically: "They packed 30 days' training into 84 days."

One of the most common issues of the Army officers interviewed was that they had to adjust their limited training experience to the unique conditions in Iraq. Bolstered by the success of advisory efforts in Kosovo, and unaware of the extent that Saddam’s tyranny had degraded Iraqi institutions, the military at first underestimated the language and cultural barriers to the advising effort. According to Lt. Col. Paul Ciesinski, who was an advisor in northern Iraq beginning in early 2005, the initial training was outdated and incomplete. He added sarcastically, “They packed 30 days’ training into 84 days.”

Sullivan, who advised three infantry companies in the Iraqi army, called the U.S. Army's instruction for the mission "very disappointing."

Sullivan, who advised three infantry companies in the Iraqi army, called the U.S. Army’s initial instruction for the mission “very disappointing.”

Nor were the officers impressed by some of their peers. Maj. Jeffrey Allen, an active-duty soldier, noted that all other members of his team were from the National Guard, and that his team was supposed to have 10 members but was given only five. He described his team as "weak . . . in particular the brigade team chief."

A separate internal review this year by the military's Center for Army Lessons Learned, based on 152 interviews with soldiers involved in the training and advisory program, found that there was "no standardized guideline" for preparing advisers and that such instruction was needed because "a majority of advisors have little to no previous experience or training."

An internal review by the Army’s Center for Army Lessons Learned, based on 152 interviews with soldiers involved in the early training and advisory program, found that "a majority of advisors have little to no previous experience or training."

Lt. Col. Michael Negard, a spokesman for the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, the headquarters for training, said he has not seen the Lessons Learned report and so does not know whether the training has been improved or standardized since that report was issued.

After arriving in Iraq, advisers said, they often were shocked to find that the interpreters assigned to them were of little use. Ciesinski reported that at his base in western Nineveh province, "They couldn't speak English and we would have to fire them."

Nor were there enough interpreters to go around, said Sullivan. "It was a real juggling act" with interpreters, he said, noting that he would run from the headquarters to a company "to borrow an interpreter, run him over to say something, and then send him back."

But he was better off than Maj. Robert Dixon, who reported that during his tour in 2004, "We had no interpreters at the time."

The Center for Army Lessons Learned study, whose contents were first reported by the Wall Street Journal, found one unit that learned after 10 frustrating months that its interpreters were "substandard" and had been translating the advisers' instructions so poorly that their Iraqi pupils had difficulty understanding the concepts being taught.

Trainers and advisers also reported major problems with the Army supply chain. "As an adviser, I got the impression that there was an 'us' and 'them' " divide between the advisers and regular U.S. forces, said Maj. Pete Fedak, an adviser near Fallujah in 2004. "In other words, there was an American camp and then, outside, there was a bermed area for the Iraqis, of which we were part."

Advisers also recalled difficulties with interpreters. Ciesinski reported that at his base some interpreters, “couldn't speak English and we would have to fire them.”

Nor were there enough interpreters to go around, said Sullivan. "It was a real juggling act" with interpreters, he said, noting that he would run from the headquarters to a company "to borrow an interpreter, run him over to say something, and then send him back."

Maj. Robert Dixon, reported that at the beginning of his tour in 2004, "We had no interpreters," so they had to use a lot of volunteers in the Iraqi army, “who could speak English pretty well.”

The Center for Army Lessons Learned study found one unit that learned that its interpreters were "substandard" and had been translating the advisers' instructions so poorly that their Iraqi pupils had difficulty understanding the concepts being taught.

Despite these initial problems, most advisers had positive recollections of their interpreters. They “were our lifeblood,” Sullivan said. “When we finally got these guys, we developed real good relationships with them.” Col. Joseph Buche, who commanded a battalion from the 101st Airborne Division in northern Iraq in 2003, agreed. “One of our great strengths is that we had more than one interpreter per platoon in our [area of operations] up north.”

Replacing basic office materials was one of the toughest problems advisers reported. "Guys would come under fire so they could get computer supplies, paper and things like that," Sullivan said. "It was a surreal experience."

Lt. Col. Paul Yingling, a staff officer with the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in Iraq in 2005 and 2006 who worked with Iraqi units, came away thinking that the Army fundamentally is not geared to the task of helping the advisory effort.

"The thing the Army institutionally is still struggling to learn is that the most important thing we do in counterinsurgency is building host-nation institutions," he told the interviewers, "yet all our organizations are designed around the least important line of operations: combat operations."

Lt. Col. Paul Yingling, a staff officer with the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in Iraq in 2005 and 2006 who worked with Iraqi units, thought part of the problem came from institutional lag within the Army. “The thing the Army institutionally is still struggling to learn is that the most important thing we do in counterinsurgency is building host-nation institutions," he told the interviewers, "yet all our organizations are designed around the least important line of [counterinsurgency] operations: combat operations." But, he added, “Eventually the institutional Army will catch up.”

There are indications that the catching up has already begun. Dixon says of the new training teams headed to Iraq, “They went through a month’s train up of very standardized training, so what we came up with and what they’re going through now is a lot different.” Advisers need to “know how to do training, training management, understand training, those types of things,” said Maj. Jeffrey Allen. “That being said, most of that is done now.”

Advisers found that the capabilities of Iraqi forces "ran the gamut from atrocious to excellent," as it was put by Lt. Col. Kevin Farrell, who commanded an armored unit in east Baghdad last year and this year.

Many worried that the Iraqi units being advised contained insurgents. An Iraqi National Guard battalion "was infiltrated by the enemy," said Maj. Michael Monti, a Marine who was an adviser in the Upper Euphrates Valley in 2004 and 2005.

Some advisers reported being personally targeted by infiltrators. "We had insurgents that we detected and arrested in the battalion that were planning an operation against me and my team," Allen said.

But Iraqi officers may have had even more to fear, because their families were also vulnerable. "I went through seven battalion commanders in eight weeks," Allen noted. Dixon reported that in Samarra both his battalion commander and intelligence officer deserted just before a major operation.

Iraqis also had some complaints about their U.S. advisers, most notably that junior U.S. officers who had never seen combat were counseling senior Iraqi officers who had fought in several wars. "Numerous teams have lieutenants . . . to fill the role of advisor to an Iraqi colonel counterpart," the Lessons Learned report stated.

Farrell, the officer in east Baghdad, said some advisers were literally "phoning in" their work. Some would not leave the forward operating base "more than one or two days out of the week -- instead they would just call the Iraqis on cellphones," he said.

Dixon was grim about the experience. "Would I want to go back and do it again?" he asked. His unambiguous answer: "No."

Yingling came to a broader conclusion. He recommended an entirely different orientation in Iraq, both for trainers and for regular U.S. units. "Don't train on finding the enemy," he said. "Train on finding your friends, and they will help you find your enemy. . . . Once you find your friends, finding the enemy is easy."

In 2004 and 2005, however, the advisers on the ground had to lead the way, despite the difficulties. Ciesinski said, “The biggest thing I can take out of my year there was overcoming the bad start we had and the lack of training we received.”

According to the latest reports, over 320,000 Iraqi security forces have been trained and equipped – 134,000 in the military and 188,000 in the police forces. True, many of the trained units have done poorly; Lt. Col. Kevin Farrell, who commanded an armored unit in east Baghdad last year and this year, said they “ran the gamut from atrocious to excellent.”

But the raw numbers have had an effect as the Iraqis have become increasingly responsible for their own security over the last two years. And even the early advisers were uniformly proud of the successes of their units, despite the rough start.

“I think we did the best we could under the circumstances,” recalled Dixon. “Our battalion did relatively well.”

When asked if his training team was successful, Allen gave an unambiguous answer, “Oh, absolutely.” He added, “I was glad that I was down in the weeds, living, eating and fighting with the Iraqi soldiers. That was the most rewarding experience that I can possibly think of, being in Iraq.”

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Have a Happy Thanksgiving. I'll see you next week.